ANGELA ANTONICELLI, Appellee, v. DANIEL JUAN RODRIGUEZ et al. (Karl Browder et al., Appellants), 2018 IL 121943 (2018)

April 2018

On November 2, 2013, Angela Antonicelli, was a passenger in a vehicle traveling eastbound on I-88 near Naperville. Defendant Karl Browder was operating a semi-tractor and trailer on behalf of Chicago Tube and Iron Company and Trillium Staffing, d/b/a Trillium Drivers Solutions (hereinafter the Browder defendants), traveling eastbound behind Antonicelli's vehicle.

Defendant Daniel Rodriguez, under the influence of cocaine, was traveling westbound and made an improper U-turn through the median on I-88 and collided with Antonicelli's vehicle. Browder was unable to stop his semi and slammed into the passenger side door of Antonicelli's vehicle. Antonicelli suffered severe permanent injuries.

Rodriguez pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence of drugs and is currently serving a sentence of seven years of imprisonment.

Antonicelli sued alleging the defendants' negligence caused her extensive personal injuries. Antonicelli entered into a settlement with Rodriguez for $20,000, the limit of his insurance coverage. Rodriguez filed a motion for a finding of a good faith settlement with Antonicelli.

The nonsettling defendants then filed a counterclaim for contribution against Rodriguez alleging Rodriguez's conduct was intentional rather than negligent.

After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted Rodriguez's petition for a finding of good faith and dismissal.

The Browder defendants appealed, arguing Rodriguez acted intentionally in causing the accident and that section 2 of the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2 (2012)) does not permit a finding of a good faith settlement with an intentional tortfeasor. The defendants also contended the trial court erred because it failed to consider their rights under section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure, limiting liability of minimally responsible defendants.

The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Supreme Court stated: "the Contribution Act seeks to promote two important public policies—the encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors."

The Browder defendants admitted their sole purpose for objecting to the settlement was to keep Rodriguez on the jury verdict form for an apportionment of joint and several liability under section 2-1117.

The Court rejected the defendants' argument because their counterclaim was irrelevant to the determination of good faith. "because the Browder co-defendants' counterclaims alleging intentional conduct are separate and independent causes of action, they do not change the nature of Antonicelli's complaint, which alleged only negligent conduct."

The defendants also argued the trial court erred in entering a finding of good faith because it failed to consider their rights under section 2-1117 of the Code. The Court held:

The settling parties have the initial burden of making a preliminary showing of good faith under the Contribution Act. This initial burden is met with proof of a legally valid settlement agreement. The nonsettling defendants must then prove the absence of good faith by a preponderance of the evidence. Again, a finding of good faith requires the court to balance two important public policies: (1) to encourage settlements and (2) to promote the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors. Nonsettling defendants may offer proof that the settling parties engaged in wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud to establish an absence of good faith.

The Court reasoned Rodriguez negotiated the settlement with Antonicelli for $20,000, his insurance policy limits, in exchange for a full release of any and all claims against him. The Browder defendants did not allege or present any evidence that Rodriguez and Antonicelli engaged in any wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud.

As aptly noted by the appellate court, "requiring a trial court to make a determination as to each defendant's fault before finding that a settlement agreement was entered into in good faith would be impracticable and would defeat the purpose of section 2 of the Contribution Act of encouraging compromise and settlement in the absence of bad faith, fraud, or collusion." 2017 IL App (1st) 153532-U, ¶ 31.

This case does not involve a Kotecki v. Cyclops scenario where liability is unlimited usually found in construction cases. Case law has not dealt directly with that fact pattern. However, based on the Supreme Court's analysis it may no longer be a valid objection to a good faith finding. The result here simply places the importance of the Contribution Act over 2-1117 to the extreme detriment of minimally liable defendants.