Assaulted by a Co-Employee on the Job: Is it Comp? Is it Civil? Is It Both?

November 2025

Jeffrey F. Clement

When an employee is assaulted by a co-employee while on a worksite, the employee is allowed to file both a worker’s compensation claim, as well as a common law civil claim against the employer. An employee may feel the need to proceed with this course of action if the employee is uncertain of the grounds for recovery and/or whether the claim is compensable under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.

However, establishing civil liability against the employer for an intentional assault by a co-employee is uphill battle. Intentional violent acts of employees are traditionally considered “accidental” and unforeseeable from the employer’s perspective.

In Kordas v. Bob’s All Bright Electric, Inc., 2025 IL App (3d) 240482, Kordas tried to pursue a creative theory of recovery against his employer: negligent hiring, negligent supervision and intentional concealment. However, the end result was the court granted summary judgment for the employer. This finding was affirmed on appeal to the Illinois Court of Appeals for the Third District.

Kordas was a long-time employee of an electrical contracting company. While on assignment with the company owner’s son, the son unexpectedly struck Kordas over the head with the shovel while having a psychotic episode. Kordas alleged the electrical contracting company knew or should have known that the son had a history of mental health issues, and therefore negligently hired and supervised the son. Kordas also alleged the company intentionally concealed the son’s dangerous propensities.

The company responded by asserting Kordas’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See 820 ILCS 305/5(a). The case proceeded through discovery. At the conclusion of discovery, the company filed a motion for summary judgment on its exclusive remedy defense, which was granted by the trial court.

On appeal, the court noted that the father likely had knowledge that the son had a history of mental health issues, including bipolar diagnosis and hospitalizations. However, importantly, there was no evidence in the record that any of the son’s mental health struggles involved violence against anyone.

In granting summary judgment to the company, the court in Kordas addressed the limited exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions, which include the following: (1) the injury was not accidental, (2) the injury did not arise from or during the course of employee’s employment, and (3) the injury was not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

On the issue of whether this was an “accidental injury” from the employer’s perspective, the employer must have committed or expressly authorized the co-employee’s intentional act. In Kordas, there was no evidence that the father committed or expressly authorized to son to strike Kordas with a shovel. Furthermore, as to the allegation of intentional concealment, there was insufficient of knowledge of the son’s alleged violent tendencies.

As to whether the claim would be considered compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the key inquiry is whether the incident arose out of the employment. The term “arising out of the employment” refers to the causal connection between the working conditions and the injury the employee suffers. In Kordas, the appellate court found the deposition testimony clearly established that Kordas and the son had no personal relationship outside of work and any dispute between the two was purely work related. Therefore, the only inference in the record was the injury arose out of the course of employment and was compensable.

Kordas included a dissent from Judge Anderson, who felt there were questions of fact because the son had apparently had an altercation with a brother severe enough for the Elgin police to be called, as well as a history being institutionalized. However, as indicated, the key deciding factor in Kordas was a scant record to support an inference the son had a particular propensity to violence.

The court Kordas recognized an important concept to liability - The mere fact of having mental health struggles does not lead to an inference of propensity to violence. Likewise, employers should not be faced with civil liability merely for employing individuals with mental health struggles. Indeed, failing to hire someone or terminating an employee due to mental health struggles might subject the employer to a claim for mental health discrimination.